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Abstract
This research empirically examines the relationship between conservatism in
accounting and the allowance for doubtful accounts. A sample of companies’ financial
data related to the allowance for doubtful accounts and bad debt expense in the
chemical and allied products manufacturers industry, SIC 28, for the period from 2005
through 2017 was obtained. The results of analysis of this data indicate that the
allowance for doubtful accounts is overstated in these firms and has become more
overstated since 2004. This research is important as few have researched the
allowance for doubtful accounts, and that research has not considered the allowance for
doubtful accounts as a percentage of the accounts receivable balance.
Keywords: bad debt, allowance for doubtful accounts, conservatism, write-off, cookiejar reserves
Introduction
Conservatism permeates accounting standards. Generally, conservatism provides that
accountants tend to wait until virtual certainty for recording good events while merely
probable for recording bad events. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts
(SFAC) No. 2 states that conservatism is a reasonable reaction to unknown, and if
multiple equally possible estimates are available then the less optimistic estimate
should be recognized (FASB, 1980). Conservatism refers to the adage “anticipate no
profits and provide for all probable losses” (Bliss, 1924). This definition of conservatism
has been restated to report the lowest possible alternative value for assets but the
highest possible value among alternatives for liabilities (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
The research focuses on conservatism as it relates to the allowance for doubtful
accounts in the chemical and allied products manufacturers (SIC 28) industry due to the
number of publicly traded firms in the industry and their relatively large accounts
receivable balances. The U.S. Department of Labor indicates that businesses in this
group include those producing:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Industrial inorganic chemicals
Plastics and resins
Drugs
Soaps, detergents, cleaning preparations and toiletries
Paint, varnishes, lacquers and enamels
Industrial organic chemicals
Agricultural chemicals, and
Miscellaneous chemical products

This research studies the understatement of accounts receivable and the continually
increasing level of understatement. This research is important because only a few
have researched the allowance for doubtful accounts even though accounts receivable
is a material balance sheet account for numerous companies. McNichols and Wilson
(1988) model bad debt expense based on three economic determinants that explain a
significant portion of bad debt expense. Others find that firms manage earnings using
receivables (Teoh et al., 1998; Marquardt and Wiedmand, 2004; Caylor, 2010).
Jackson and Liu (2010) performed extensive research on the allowance for doubtful
accounts across broad industries from 1980 through 2004. However, no research has
been conducted since. Also, their research did not consider the allowance for doubtful
accounts as a percentage of the accounts receivable balance.
Accounts receivable represents amounts due from customers because of credit sales to
the customers and is typically recorded as a current asset on the balance sheet
(Financial Accounting Foundation, 2017e). For companies that typically extend such
credit to customers, accounts receivable can be material to their financial statements.
Accounts receivable are reported on the balance sheet at net realizable value, which is
the estimated amount a firm can expect to collect from its customers (Gordon et al.,
2016). The net realizable value is reported as the asset account of accounts receivable
less a contra-asset account of allowance for doubtful accounts on the balance sheet
(Gordon et.al., 2016). Therefore, the allowance for doubtful accounts is an estimate by
the firm of the amounts it will not collect from customers.
Accounting standards generally accepted in the United States require companies to
estimate losses (in this instance bad debt expense) when it is probable that a loss has
occurred, and the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated (Financial
Accounting Foundation, 2017e). Estimating the probable bad debt should be based on
the company’s prior experience, information about customers, current economic
conditions, or industry standards (Financial Accounting Foundation, 2017e).
Companies record bad debt related to accounts receivable with a debit to bad debt
expense (an income statement account) and a credit to allowance for doubtful accounts
(a balance sheet account) (Gordon et.al., 2016). When conditions become known that
a customer will not pay an outstanding receivable, the company will “write-off” the
receivable or remove the balance from the balance sheet. Since the dollar amount of
write-offs related to accounts receivable has already been estimated through the
allowance for doubtful accounts, the method of recording the write-off is to reduce the
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accounts receivable balance by the now known unpaid account through a credit to the
account and reduce the allowance for doubtful accounts through a debit by the same
amount (Gordon et.al., 2016).
There are generally two broad methods of estimating probable bad debt based on prior
experience: one is based on a percentage of the current period’s credit sales and the
other is based on a percentage of outstanding receivables (Gordon et.al., 2016). Prior
research has considered the reasonableness of bad debt expense as a percentage of
sales but did not consider the reasonableness of the allowance for doubtful accounts as
a percentage of outstanding receivables (Jackson and Liu, 2010). Given that firms
estimate bad debts using one of two methods and both the balance sheet and income
statement are impacted, this research will add to the body of knowledge by investigating
both the income statement impact and the balance sheet impact.
Literature Review
Conservatism is studied and utilized in two forms: conditional and unconditional. The
significant difference between the two is unconditional conservatism is based on
information known at the beginning of an asset’s life while conditional conservatism is
based on information obtained in future periods (Basu, 2005).
Conditional conservatism happens when an event triggers significant negative news to
be recognized in financial statements; however, similar significant positive news does
not trigger recognition in the financial statements. As an example, information leading
to the belief that fixed assets are impaired would result in a loss being recorded;
however, information leading to the belief that fixed assets have significantly
appreciated would not result in a gain being recorded (Financial Accounting Foundation,
2017a). Another example of conditional conservatism would include lower of cost or
market for inventory. In this practice, inventory value is lowered if market conditions
indicate the original cost exceeds current replacement cost (Financial Accounting
Foundation, 2017b). The opposite is not reported when inventory replacement costs
become higher than the original cost of inventory (Financial Accounting Foundation,
2017b).
Another example of conditional conservatism would be loss contingencies. Loss
contingencies result when the likelihood of a future event related to a current or prior
period will cause economic loss to an entity is probable (Financial Accounting
Foundation, 2017c). If the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated and the
likelihood of the loss is probable, then the entity should record a charge (loss) to income
(Financial Accounting Foundation, 2017c). However, a gain contingency that meets all
the same requirements of a loss contingency, except it results in probable economic
benefit, is not recorded (Financial Accounting Foundation, 2017d). This contrasting
treatment is conservatism.
Unconditional conservatism, as the name suggests, does not occur after a specific
economic event. Rather, unconditional conservatism is an accounting principle being
applied consistently and regularly (Ruch and Taylor, 2015).
An example of
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unconditional conservatism would be the last in first out (LIFO) method of inventory cost
flow. Under a typical inflationary environment, LIFO results in lower inventory values
than other inventory cost flow methodologies because it expenses the most recent costs
and values inventory at the oldest costs (Gordon et.al., 2016). Accelerated depreciation
expenses most of an asset’s value early in the asset’s useful life and represents
unconditional conservatism. Other examples of unconditional conservatism would
include expensing research and development costs and expensing advertising costs
(Ruch and Taylor, 2015).
Conservatism in accounting is an almost ancient practice. Sterling (1967) believes
conservatism in accounting is the most widespread and oldest accounting principle. An
analysis of Italian and German merchant records dating as far back as the early
fifteenth century describes applying conservatism primarily to reduce taxes (Penndorf,
1930). In the late 16th century, Benedictine monks published accounting guidelines
including accounting for inventory, their guidance was that goods should always be
valued at a standard price lower than market to always sell at a profit (Vance, 1943). In
the late 18th century, Prussia required valuation of inventory at (lower of) cost or market
to combat fraudulent over-reporting of inventory (Vance, 1943). Vance (1943) concludes
his historical research of inventory cost methods that they grew out of the needs of
businessmen.
Watts (2003a) believes conservatism has arisen out of four business
needs: contracting, litigation avoidance, taxes and regulation.
Basu (1997) explains that conservatism arises naturally between parties in a contractual
arrangement. The natural tendency toward conservatism stems from opposing benefits
from contracting parties or asymmetry. Conservatism is a means of addressing the
differing information available to contracting parties, asymmetric payoffs, varying time
frames and limited liability or benefits (Watts, 2003a).
Several have suggested the benefit of accounting conservatism for efficiency in
contracting debt specifically (Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b; Basu, 1997; Zhang, 2008).
The general idea with lending is lenders do not benefit from better than expected news;
however, they do benefit from conservatism being applied by signaling potential default
(Zhang, 2008; Basu, 1997). Another way of looking at this is debt holders do not benefit
if a firm does very well and produces higher than expected net assets (Watts, 2003a).
The debt holders only receive the re-payment of their loan to the firm. However, if a firm
has lower than anticipated net assets (an amount insufficient to re-pay the debt), the
debt holders lose. This asymmetric benefit for debt holders causes the creditors to be
more concerned with bad news resulting in inadequate net assets (Watts, 2003a).
Therefore, creditors benefit from firms employing conservatism. Creditors also tend to
place some type of lower limit on net assets that allows the creditors to call the debt and
restrict management’s actions that could lower net assets (Beneish and Press, 1993),
(Watts, 2003a). The financial crisis and credit crunches led to firms needing to raise
financing (Ivanshina and Scharstein, 2010), and several have found that firms
employing conservatism enjoy lower financing costs (Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008;
Francis et al., 2013).
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Positive accounting theorists attempt to explain and forecast actual accounting practices
by firms rather than prescribe what should be done (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).
Positive accounting theory believes that conservatism in accounting is an efficient
mechanism for contracting and governing firms to address information asymmetry and
agency problems (Watts, 2003a; LaFond and Watts, 2008). This means boards can
govern firm management better using accounting conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman,
2007). Agency costs happen when managers or other firm-related parties consider or
maximize their own payoffs instead of the firm’s (Watts, 2003a). Contracts between the
parties requiring certain conservative accounting methodologies can help firms reduce
these agency costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Managers naturally have
motivations to prevent losses (or even hide them) to avoid being reprimanded, have
bonuses reduced or being fired. Basu (1997) believes managers utilize conservative
accounting to avoid compensation losses due to their own bias. Yao and Deng (2018)
find that managers will manipulate working capital components, including accounts
receivable, for managing earnings and resulting incentives. Also, earnings that have
been measured conservatively can result in future, long-term benefits to managers
through deferred compensation plans at retirement (Smith and Watts, 1982).
Watts (2003a) believes all types of conservatism benefit contracting by constraining
management’s behavior. Some believe that only conditional conservatism improves
contracting efficiency because it provides parties with new information; however,
unconditional conservatism does not provide outside parties with new information (Ball
and Shivakumar, 2005).
Firms that utilize conservative accounting can have reduced litigation costs because a
firm is more likely to face shareholder litigation by overstating net assets than by
understating net assets through conservatism (Watts, 2003a). Watts (2003a) also
believes conservatism reduces the possibility of regulators and standard setters being
criticized by placing value on conservatism as a constraint to managers. Leftwich
(1995) found that most of the FASB agenda items and decisions from the mid-seventies
to the mid-nineties resulted in delayed income recognition and increased liabilities.
Givoly and Hayn (2002) believe this focus by the FASB was due to the ever-increasing
litigious environment in the United States. Even earlier, Skinner (1994) found managers
are more likely to let investors know about bad news than good news to avoid litigation.
Similar to the Italian merchants trying to lower their ad valorem taxes, Basu (1997)
asserts most forms of unconditional conservatism arose from tax benefits. In the early
20th century, U.S. tax law provided for deductions of reasonable amounts for the
exhaustion or wear and tear of property used in business (Saliers, 1939). Saliers
(1939) points out that not long after this, businesses started utilizing the conditional
conservatism of lower of cost or market for inventories more frequently and the
unconditional conservative double declining balance method of depreciation. Double
declining balance method of depreciation uses a rate that is double the straight-line rate
applied to the book value (cost less accumulated depreciation) of an asset resulting in
much higher depreciation early in an asset’s life and lower depreciation later (Gordon
et.al., 2016). The inventory cost flow method of LIFO developed out of an older
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inventory method referred to as base stock method which was not allowed for
calculating income taxes (Davis, 1982). The use of LIFO by firms increased
substantially following World War II in response to higher inflation and to lower income
taxes (Davis, 1982). Since income taxes were not introduced until the late 18th century,
the use of unconditional conservatism methods such as these is relatively new
compared with some conditional conservatism like the lower of cost or market for
inventory (Basu, 2005). This leads to the assumption that income taxes have played a
major role in the acceptance and use of unconditional conservatism in accounting.
Firms can lower their taxes by employing conservatism because conservatism
recognizes expenses relatively early and delays revenues.
In some cases, conservatism arose out of regulatory environment. Boockholdt (1978)
notes that nineteenth and early twentieth century rail companies in the United States
were subject to tremendous regulation by the federal government. Much of the
regulation had to do with logs of shipments, but railroad companies also had to report
results of operations and financial condition in voluminous annual reports. To reduce
the likelihood of valuation adjustments being made by examiners or auditors for
reasonable valuation of assets and because rail companies had tremendous
investments in fixed assets, most railroad companies adopted the double declining
balance method for depreciation (Boockholdt, 1978).
Earnings that repeat over time are persistent. Applying conservatism, however, results
in asymmetry in the timeliness of information and persistence of earnings. Further, bad
news is timelier, yet less persistent, while good news is less timely but more persistent
(Basu, 1997). Another way to put this is bad news does not necessarily repeat; goods
news often repeats. Research has indicated that conservatism understates accounting
values of equity compared to fair values of equity. That is, assets and revenues are
understated, and liabilities and expenses are overstated (Ruch and Taylor, 2015).
However, as noted above, accounting practices and standards still utilize the concept of
conservatism as the reasoning.
One element of accruals that investors will look toward is cash flows. Cash flows are
often lagged by one or more periods from resulting accruals (Houmes and Skantz,
2010). In the case of applying conservatism, the bad news is recorded before the
resulting decrease in cash flows or expenditure (Byzalov and Basu, 2016).
Balachandran and Monhanram (2011) observe that utilization of conditional and
unconditional conservatism has increased. They note a general trend of declining value
relevance during the same period. However, they find no evidence of a decline in value
relevance of accounting information in firms that also had increased conservatism.
In its supersession of SFAC No. 2 through SFAC No. 8, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) comments that conservatism is excluded from the new
financial accounting concepts because it directly conflicts with neutrality (FASB, 2010).
Conservatism has deep roots in accounting perhaps dating back hundreds of years
(Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). Under the concept of neutrality, conservatism has no
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place in accounting standards (FASB, 2010).
Conservatism is an intentional
understatement of a firm’s net worth which is not a neutral viewpoint. In establishing
SFAC No. 8, the FASB believes financial information should be neither understated nor
overstated (FASB, 2010). Both understatement and overstatement impair outside
users’ ability to make decisions related to a firm which is the ultimate objective of
financial reporting. Conservatism, by definition, can understate income and assets.
The FASB conclusion was this is not faithful representation. They believe neutrality
should be the goal of financial reporting. It should be noted, however, that a SFAC is a
guideline for establishing standards and not a standard in and of itself. Generally
accepted accounting principles in the United States still contain conservatism across
many areas as discussed above and many would argue is a necessary part of
accounting standards (Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b; Francis et al., 2013).
Since conservatism is so much a part of accounting standards and the resulting
financial reporting, many have attempted to measure the level of conservatism
employed by firms. Generally, conservatism is measured using one of three methods:
net assets, earnings and accrual methods, and earnings related to stock returns. Net
asset models attempt to measure the extent that assets are undervalued due to the
application of conservatism (Watts, 2003b). Earnings measures generally hold that
losses are more likely to reverse in future periods than gains (Watts, 2003b; Jackson
and Liu, 2010). The measures attempt to estimate the lag in this reversal. Accrual
methodologies attempt to measure negative accruals over a long period of time (Givoly
and Hayn 2002). Stock return methodology starts with the assumption that losses are
typically reflected in the stock price during the same period reported. However, gains
are recognized in stock prices earlier than they are ultimately reported through financial
statements (Basu, 1997).
The overwhelmingly most widely used measure of conservatism is Basu’s (1997)
asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure (AT) (Wang, et.al., 2009). Asymmetric
timeliness means that, due to conservatism, earnings reflect bad news quicker than
good news (Basu,1997). The regression estimates a slope coefficient on how timely
stock return is recognized in earnings based on the type of news utilizing the dummy
variable to distinguish between the news (Basu, 1997). As the most often cited
measure of conservatism, the Basu regression obviously has strengths (Wang, et.al.,
2009). It has been widely used for over twenty years; many researchers utilizing the AT
measure have produced results that are consistent with their predictions increasing both
the confidence in the model and the theory; and the Basu regression works well with
large cross-sectional analysis (Ryan, 2006).
Another methodology used to measure conservatism is the market-to-book or book-tomarket ratio. This methodology utilizing the assumption that all other things being
equal, conservatism in accounting depresses the book value of a firm relative to the true
economic value of the firm (Givoly et.al., 2007). This general methodology is based on
the residual income valuation model whereby Feltham and Ohlson (1995) incorporated
accounting conservatism in a valuation context (Givoly et.al., 2007). Beaver and Ryan
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(2000) later developed a model utilizing six years of lagged stock returns in a panel data
regression.
Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) negative accrual measure uses non-operating accruals as a
subset of book value. By deferring gains and accelerating recognition of losses, this
model measures the general increase in conservatism over time (Givoly and Hayn,
2000). A similar methodology is the hidden reserve (or cookie jars) method developed
by Penman and Xiao-Jun (2002). Their model creates a C score that consists of the
estimated hidden reserve divided by the net operating assets of the firm (operating
assets minus operating liabilities, excluding financing liabilities). Givoly et al., (2007)
point out that the estimated reserve method involves a lot of estimation to derive
another estimation. It is also apparent the model does not apply to firms who do not
utilize LIFO but may have significant lower of cost or market adjustments in their
inventory. The model also does not take into consideration any other potential “cookie
jars” such as the allowance for doubtful accounts and inventory obsolescence.
The Basu regression, AACF, market-to-book ratio, negative accrual measure, and C
Score utilize aggregate accounting measures and end up with the conclusion that
accounting is conservative and has become more conservative over time (Watts,
2003a). Jackson and Liu (2010) were the first to assess conservatism on an individual
accrual account, the allowance for doubtful accounts. In their study of firms from 1980
through 2004, they developed two measures of conservatism related to the allowance
for doubtful accounts (Jackson and Liu, 2010). Their study finds that between 1980 and
2004 the average firm had amounts in its allowance for doubtful accounts enough to
cover two and a half years of write-offs.
Their measures only look at the allowance as it relates to the income statement rather
than also reviewing the balance sheet impact. Although they did report an average of
the allowance account as a percentage of the total accounts receivable, they did not
comment on the conservative nature of the ratio.
Hypotheses
As Jackson and Liu (2010) and others have indicated, excessive conservatism can be
prevalent because auditors view overstatement of assets or understatement of liabilities
as a higher risk than understatement of assets or overstatement of liabilities (Arens et
al., 2012). There is evidence in numerous studies that indicates auditors are permissive
on the overstatement of the allowance for doubtful accounts and resulting
understatement of net accounts receivable (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Kinney and
Martin, 1994; Nelson et al., 2002). In fact, Nelson et al. (2002) find that auditors only
adjust for overstated liabilities approximately 37% of the time. Jackson and Liu (2010)
found that the allowance for doubtful accounts was conservative in a study of
companies from 1980 through 2004. Therefore, hypothesis one is as follows:
H1: The allowance for doubtful accounts is overstated by chemical and allied
products manufacturers.
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Repeated application of unconditional conservatism can create hidden reserves that
can be released into income that distorts reported performance (Penman and Xiao-Jun,
2002). Jackson and Liu’s (2010) illustration in Table 1, below, provides a vivid
illustration of how these hidden reserves can build over time like the following:
Table 1 – Build-up of Cookie Jar Reserves in Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
Beginning
Ending
Allowance
Bad
Allowance
for Doubtful
Debt
for Doubtful
Accounts
Expense Write-offs Accounts
Year
1
1,000
1,000
2
1,000
1,000
900
1,100
3
1,100
1,000
900
1,200
4
1,200
1,000
900
1,300
5
1,300
1,000
900
1,400
6
1,400
1,000
900
1,500
7
1,500
1,000
900
1,600
8
1,600
1,000
900
1,700
9
1,700
1,000
900
1,800
10
1,800
1,000
900
1,900
11
1,900
1,000
900
2,000
This illustrates a company that is likely simply recording bad debt expense of $1,000 per
year and only writing off $900 per year. In short time, the allowance account represents
2.2 years’ worth of bad debts, or net accounts receivable is now understated by $1,100.
Jackson and Liu (2010) found that on average firms had about 3.2 years’ worth of bad
debt in their allowance for doubtful accounts. Others have observed that in general
conservatism has increased in accounting over the years (Watts, 2003a; Givoly and
Hayn, 2000). Therefore, hypothesis two is as follows:
H2: Chemical and allied products manufacturers have increasingly overstated
their allowance for doubtful accounts since 2004.
Data and Methodology
A temporal analysis of bad debt expense has been performed. H1 and H2 are both
measures of the size of the allowance for doubtful accounts as they would relate to
reasonableness and consistency. Therefore, they are tested with the following:
CON_1 = ALLOWit/WOit+1
CON_2 = BDEit – WOit+1
ALLOW is the allowance for uncollectible accounts. WO is write-offs of uncollectible
accounts. BDE is bad debt expense. i and t are firm and year subscripts.
In auditing these would be described as analytical procedures (Arens et al., 2012). An
analytical procedure is designed to allow an auditor to estimate what the dollar amount
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of an account should be or set an expectation (Arens et al., 2012). The expected value
of CON 1 is one. The allowance account should represent the amount of bad debt in
accounts receivable that will not be collected. Since forms 10K do not indicate which
sales year a write-off relates to, all the write-offs in year t+1 will be assumed to be from
year t. A value of greater than one indicates the allowance for doubtful accounts is
overstated. Similarly, the expected values of CON 2 is zero because the bad debt
expense for period t is expected to equal the write-offs for period t+1. Values higher
than these would indicate the allowance account is overstated.
We further test these assertions by empirically temporally examining the yearly medians
for CON_1 and CON_2 over the years of this study (YR). This research assigns
numbers for each year that increase sequentially over the 2005 to 2017 years where
year 2005 is equal to 0 and 2017 is equal to 11.
That is:
ALLOWit/WOit+1 = YR
BDEit – WOit+1 = YR
A positive sign on the YR coefficients would provide support for the notion that firms
have increasingly overstated their allowance accounts.
Traditionally, the allowance for doubtful accounts has been viewed as unconditional
conservatism (Ruch and Taylor, 2015). However, unconditional conservatism is based
on information known at the beginning of an asset’s life while conditional conservatism
is based on information obtained future periods (Basu, 2005). Changes in the
methodology for determining bad debt expense based on current conditions rather than
consistently applied processes would indicate that the allowance for doubtful accounts
is conditional conservatism.
In gathering the data, this study obtained total accounts receivable, total allowance for
uncollectible accounts, total assets and other firm-level data from COMPUSTAT
database of North American firms for companies with the standardized industry code
(SIC) of 28 which represents chemical and allied products manufacturers. Bad debt
expense and write-offs are not reported by COMPUSTAT, so they were obtained from
the firms’ forms 10K schedule II filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) during the study period from 2005 (the period after the Jackson and Liu (2010)
research) through 2017.
The initial extraction from COMPUSTAT of firms with the SIC of 28 from 2005 through
2017 with accounts receivable balances and allowance for doubtful accounts resulted in
285 firms and 4,128 total observations. Utilizing Stata, the firm ID (gvkey) variable was
destrung into a numerical variable - gvkeynum. The resulting companies were sorted
by gvkeynum and fiscal year. Included in these companies were foreign registered
firms that do not report a Schedule II (or equivalent) for disclosures in changes of
valuation accounts. These were dropped for lack of data needed for the study. Also
dropped were all firms that did not have an allowance for doubtful accounts. Finally, the
EDGAR database was searched and Forms 10K were reviewed for bad debt expense
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(BDE) and net write-offs (WO) for each firm year. Those firms that did not disclose
these changes in their allowance for doubtful accounts, typically citing immateriality,
were also dropped. The resulting sample was 88 total firms representing 795 firm
years. Of the 88 firms, 30 had data for the entire period from 2005 through 2017.
The manual entries of BDE and WO were reviewed to reduce researcher error by a
research assistant reading the amounts back to the researcher for confirmation with the
10K. Subsequent verification of amounts by starting with the beginning of the year
allowance for doubtful accounts adding bad debt expense and then subtracting net
recoveries, as has been referenced in earlier research (Jackson and Liu, 2010), is
impossible because virtually 100 percent of the companies have other activity in the
allowance for doubtful accounts such as acquisitions, divestitures and most commonly
foreign currency changes. In addition, prior research has indicated the use of gross
write-offs and gross recoveries in modeling (Jackson and Liu, 2010). Again, this was
not possible. Substantially all companies reported net write-offs or recoveries.
Table 2 – Summary Statistics for Sample
Total Observations: 795
Standard
Deviation Minimum
Mean
Total assets (millions)
9,356
18,395
38
Sales (Millions)
6,234
10,532
5
Market value (Millions)
13,949
28,557
0
Accounts receivable to total assets
0.91%
2.0%
0.0%
Accounts receivable to current assets
2.36%
4.9%
0.0%
Bad debt expense to net income
1.10%
165.2% 4345.5%
Write-offs to net income
1.18%
173.0% 4436.4%

Maximum
192,164
71,312
258,341
13.9%
34.5%
1009.1%
1100.0%

Results
H1 states that the allowance for doubtful accounts is overstated by companies, and H2
states that the level of overstatement is increasing. These are tested by CON_1 and
CON_2.
As noted above, CON_1 = ALLOWit/WOit+1. Therefore, a zero value in WOit+1 results in
an irrational number that cannot be analyzed. However, zero write-offs in companies
that are recording bad debt expense could be a significant factor in measuring whether
the allowance for doubtful accounts is overstated. Therefore, the researcher added
.001 to all write-offs to eliminate zero write-offs. This did not modify any write-offs that
were originally negative (net recoveries) or existing write-offs. However, it created
values for the years where companies had zero write-offs. Both BDE and WO were
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile levels utilizing Stata. The resulting data
modifications had significant outliers due to extremely low write-offs creating extremely
high means per year in CON_1. The overall mean for the 12 years was 1,263.10 and
standard deviation of 377.34. The minimum value was 691.09 for 2006, and the
maximum value was 1,817.32 for 2011. To put this in perspective, replacing zero write62
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offs results in an average of 1,263 years of write-offs reserved by the allowance for
doubtful accounts. Given the wide variation of the means, the medians are believed to
be a better test.
While the means result in extremely high values for CON_1 the medians during the
study period result in more reasonable values. The medians range from a low of 2.714
in 2008 to a high of 4.606 in 2011. As Table 3 indicates, the trend is increasing for the
entire study period.
Table 3 – CON_1 Medians Replacing Zeros with .01

CON_1 Median with
Zeros replaced with .01
5.000
4.500
4.000
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
0.500
2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Jackson and Liu (2010) found on average companies had 3.031 years’ worth of writeoffs (CON_1) in 2004. They haphazardly utilized 5.5 years for missing write-offs.
Based on their findings and the significant outliers causing very unusual calculations for
CON_1 means, missing CON_1 values due to zero write-offs were re-keyed as 3.031.
Also, negative CON_1 values due to net recoveries were re-keyed as 3.031 as well.
This treatment ignores the impact of a few companies with zero write-offs in specific
years and, in some instances, companies with zero write-offs during the entire research
period. Therefore, the actual results would be higher CON_1 amounts if an estimate of
CON_1 for these companies could be obtained. The median for resulted in 3.031 for
each period, so this methodology was rejected. The researcher believes utilizing the
medians where zeros are replaced with .01 provides the best information for reaching
conclusions.
A reasonable value for CON_1 would be one, as this would assume that 100% of next
year’s write-offs are “reserved” by this year’s allowance for doubtful account. However,
even a value of one could be an overstatement in the allowance for doubtful accounts.
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Most firms have an accounts receivable turnover ratio of significantly higher than one
which means 100 percent of the dollar value of accounts receivables are collected more
often than once a year. Table 4 presents summaries of the sample companies’
accounts receivable turnover rations for the study period.
Table 4 – Accounts Receivable Turnover Ratios
Accounts Receivable
Turnover Ratio
Mean
Median
2005
N/A
N/A
2006
8.32
6.77
2007
7.42
6.54
2008
7.69
6.95
2009
7.58
6.40
2010
7.31
6.42
2011
9.16
6.71
2012
8.60
6.37
2013
7.76
6.25
2014
7.88
6.35
2015
7.75
5.99
2016
6.38
5.94
In every year the sample companies’ average accounts receivable turnover ratio is
significantly higher than one which leads to the conclusion that a reasonable value for
CON_1 should be less than one. Never-the-less, the researcher will consider a CON_1
value of one as reasonable even though it is conservative or marginally overstated. As
noted earlier, Jackson and Liu (2010) observed a mean of 3.031 across all industries in
2004. This means for the year prior to this study, on average companies recorded an
allowance of over three times the next year’s write-offs.
As Table 3 shows, the median of CON_1 with zeros replaced with .01. The medians
ranged 1.892 with a low of 2.714 in 2008 to a high of 4.606 in 2011. The overall mean
of the medians during the study period was 3.810.
CON_1 values greater than one for the entire 795 firm years was 742 or 92.9 percent of
all observations with the overall mean for values greater than one of 7.585.
CON_2 is also a measure of overstatement of the allowance for doubtful accounts. As
noted above, CON_2 = BDEit – WOit+1. The expectation is that CON_2 will zero or even
less than zero is reasonable because the current year’s bad debt expense should
approximate the next year’s write-offs. During the study period, CON_2 ranged from a
low of .1905 in 2006 to a high of 9.995 in 2009. The overall mean was 3.899 with a
ninety-five percent confidence level of 1.984 for the period and a standard deviation of
2.95. Again, the trend for the study period is for CON_2 to increase.
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Table 5 – CON_2 Means

CON_2 Mean
12.0000
10.0000
8.0000
6.0000
4.0000
2.0000
2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

The median for CON_2 behaves in a similar manner with a minimum of (.132) and a
maximum of 1.0. The overall trend of the medians for the companies in the study period
is for CON_2 to increase.
Table 6 – CON_2 Medians

CON_2 MEDIANS
1.200
1.000
0.800
0.600
0.400
0.200
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
(0.200)
Similar to CON_1, where most firms exceed 1.0, the majority of firms have a CON_2
exceeding zero. However, the percentages do not match exactly and are generally
lower. Overall, 58.23 percent of the firms had CON_2 greater than zero during the
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study period. Table 7 summarizes CON_1 and CON_2 where their respective
thresholds are exceeded.
Table 7 – Percentage of Companies Exceeding CON_1 and CON_2 Thresholds
CON_1
CON_2
>1
>0
Year
2005
96.77%
62.90%
2006
90.48%
49.21%
2007
92.31%
44.61%
2008
93.55%
51.61%
2009
93.85%
73.85%
2010
92.19%
56.25%
2011
88.14%
54.24%
2012
95.38%
56.92%
2013
95.16%
56.45%
2014
95.24%
57.14%
2015
91.53%
69.49%
66.04%
2016
90.57%
Mean
92.93%
58.23%
Min
88.14%
44.61%
Max
96.77%
73.85%
H1 and H2 are further tested by empirically, temporally examining the yearly medians
for CON_1 and CON_2 over the years of this study (YR). Numbers are assigned for
each year that increase sequentially over the 2005 to 2017 where year 2005 is equal to
0 and 2017 is equal to 11 as follows:
ALLOWit/WOit+1 = YR
BDEit – WOit+1 = YR
A positive sign on the YR coefficients would provide support for the notion that firms
have increasingly overstated their allowance accounts.
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Table 8 – YR independent variable of interest Median CON_1 and CON_2
Standard
95% Confidence Interval
Median Con_1 Coefficient
Error
t - value
p-value
YR
0.0111061 0.001716
6.47
0.000
0.007738
0.014475
Cons
2.890669 0.0148743
194.34
0.000
2.861472
2.919867
Median Con_2
YR
Cons

0.104492 0.0058813
-0.264876 0.0509789

17.08
-5.20

0.000
0.000

0.088904
-0.364945

0.111994
-0.164806

Results show support the prior graphical depictions of CON_1 and CON_2 annual
medians. For both equations, the coefficients on the YR independent variables of
interest are positive and significant at the p < .001 levels.
Conclusions
Hypotheses 1
The first hypothesis is the allowance for doubtful accounts is overstated by chemical
and allied products manufacturers. This hypothesis was first tested using the
calculation of the allowance for doubtful accounts divided by the next year’s write-offs of
accounts receivable, or CON_1. As previously discussed, a value of one would be
reasonable and still conservative. However, realistically, a value less than one would
still be reasonable because during the study period from 2005 through 2016, the
median accounts receivable turnover ratio ranged between 5.9 and 7.0 for the industry.
This means that companies will collect their entire balance of accounts receivables
approximately six time each year, so a CON_1 of one is still probably an overstatement
of the allowance for doubtful accounts. The median for CON_1 over the entire study
period was 3.92. The mean, due to several companies having zero write-offs, was a
huge at 1,263 when zero write-offs were replaced with .01. As Panel 1 shows, the
median of CON_1 ranged from a low of 2.714 in 2008 to a high of 4.606 in 2011. The
overall mean of the medians during the study period was 3.810. Approximately 93
percent of the sample companies had a CON_1 greater than one during the study
period.
The first hypothesis also was tested with the calculation of simply bad debt expense
less next year’s write off, or CON_2. A value of zero or even less would be reasonable.
The results show the mean for CON_2 during the study period ranged from 0.190 to
9.99 with an overall mean of 3.90. Approximately 58 percent of the sample companies
had a CON_2 of greater than zero during the study period.
Based on the results of analyzing CON_1 and CON_2, the null hypothesis is rejected.
The researchers conclude that the allowance for doubtful accounts is overstated by
chemical and allied products manufacturers during the study period of 2005 through
2016.
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Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis is chemical and allied products manufacturers have increasingly
overstated their allowance for doubtful accounts since 2004. This too was tested using
CON_1 and CON_2 as described above. The researcher, utilizing Excel’s graphing
features, inserted a trend line into each of the line graphs of the means and medians of
CON_1 and CON_2. As illustrated in the graphs of CON_1 and CON_2, shown on
Panels one, two and three, each have a positive trend line in both the means and the
medians. This assertion was further tested by empirically temporally examining the
yearly medians for CON_1 and CON_2 over the years of this study (YR). Results of
those regressions support the graphical depictions of CON_1 and CON_2.
Based on these results, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the conclusion is chemical
and allied products manufacturers have increasingly overstated their allowance for
doubtful accounts since 2004.
Opportunities for Future Research
Since the study is in only one industry, additional research into other industries should
be completed to determine to what extent results can be generalized.
Other valuation accounts, such as those for inventory and taxes, are also required by
generally accepted accounting principles. These accounts could be subject to
manipulation by management and are worthy of study. As is the case with the
allowance for doubtful accounts, both the inventory reserve account and the income tax
valuation account require disclosure of activity in Schedule II. Inventory valuation
reserves would change in a manner like the allowance for doubtful accounts. The
current period’s reserve should be realized as losses in the next period. Therefore, the
methodology utilized in this study could be modified to test inventory valuations in
companies with significant inventories.
Income tax valuation accounts could have more than one year before the ultimate
realization of losses in deferred tax assets. Therefore, the methodology for testing
would require expansion to multiple years depending on the nature of the underlying tax
assets. However, the information for deferred tax assets and their ultimate realization is
disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements.
While there is strong inference that the allowance for doubtful accounts represents
conditional rather than unconditional conservatism, this study does not directly test the
classification.
Therefore, addition research designed to specifically test the
classification of bad debt expense could be performed.
Additional research is also available for the reasoning why companies have overstated
their allowance for doubtful accounts. Do companies utilize their cookie jar reserves in
the allowance for doubtful accounts to manipulate earnings?
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